Rural to urban migration is integral to scholarship on structural transformation and economic development, but there is little evidence on how out-migration transforms the rural labor market. We offer to subsidize transport costs for 5792 potential seasonal migrants in Bangladesh, randomly varying the proportion of landless agricultural workers across 133 villages induced to move, to generate labor supply shocks of different magnitudes in different villages. We use this variation coupled with a general equilibrium model to document spillover effects on the village labor market. The decision to migrate is a strategic complement: A larger number of simultaneous migration offers in the village increases the likelihood that each individual takes up the offer, and induces those connected to offer recipients to also migrate. The 35% emigration rate in control villages increases to 42% in lower intensity villages, and to 66% with the higher density of offers. This increases the male agricultural wage rate in the village with an elasticity of about 0.2. Migration offers lead to large increases in income earned at the destination, but also increases income earned at home due to the increase in the wage rate and in available work hours. The wage bill for agricultural employers increases, which reduces their profit, with no significant change in yield. There is not much intra-household substitution in labor supply. The primary worker earns more when he returns home from the city during weeks in which many of his village co-residents were induced to move. Although most of the migration income is consumed, there is no systematic effect food prices, suggesting that food markets are better integrated than labor markets across villages. Seasonal migration generates both direct and indirect spillover benefits on the origin economies.
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Introduction
A shift in labor from rural to urban areas has been integral part of the process of economic development, and central to theories of long-run growth and structural transformation (Lewis 1954, Harris and Todaro 1970) . Migration marked American agricultural development in the 19 th century, Chinese development in the late 20 th century, and has been a feature of the growth path of virtually every developing country (Taylor and Martin 2001) . Understanding the causes and consequences of mobility -both for the migrant, and for the broader rural society -are therefore central to understanding development. (Greenwood 1997) , "increase rural poverty and income inequality," (Connell 1981) , but generations of review articles (e.g. Lucas 1997, Foster and Rosenzweig 2008) lament the lack of evidence on these topics. This study attempts to fill that gap by conducting a field experiment in which we randomly vary the fraction of landless households in Bangladeshi villages that are induced to out-migrate temporarily, to generate labor supply shocks of varying magnitudes, and use those to study spillover effects on the rural economy.
While social scientists and policymakers have noted the pervasiveness of rural-urban migration in both developed and developing societies 2 , the facts that (a) most of this migration is internal rather than international 3 , and (b) that much of the internal rural-urban movement is seasonal and circular in nature, are less well known. The rural-urban wage gap varies within the year due to crop cycles, and seasonal migration is one of the primary methods used by Indians (Banerjee and Duflo 2007) and Bangladeshis (Bryan et al 2014) to diversify income and cope with seasonality.
Such seasonal fluctuations in rural labor productivity are widespread in Ethiopia (Dercon and Krishnan 2000) , Thailand (Paxson 1993), Indonesia (Basu and Wong 201x), Malawi (Brune et al 2016) and Ghana (Banerjee et al 2015) . Seasonal migration also appears to be more responsive to policy interventions and to changes in local labor market conditions than permanent migration (Imbert and Papp 2015) .
Bryan et al (2014) encourage a sample of 1292 landless households in rural Bangladesh to migrate during the 2008 lean season using conditional transfers to cover the roundtrip travel cost to nearby cities, and show that migration significantly improves the consumption in induced households. That simple research design can only evaluate the direct effects of migration opportunities on beneficiary households, and does not answer questions about spillover effects on non-beneficiaries. We expand on that design in several ways during the 2014 lean season to study general equilibrium effects on the rural labor market, and in the process, provide a more comprehensive evaluation of a program to encourage migration. 4 We find that emigration generates a few different categories of spillovers. First, migration decisions are strategic complements: a larger number of simultaneous migration subsidy offers in a village increases each household's propensity to migrate. Much of the spillover benefit to nonbeneficiaries stem from their own increased propensity to migrate when their neighbors receive subsidies. Second, although these induced migrants earn much more in nearby cities, the time spent away does not displace home income. On the contrary, the income that the family earns at home also increases, due to increases in both the equilibrium agricultural wage rate at home and in available works hours. We use individual-specific data to explore whether departure of the migrant induces other household members to supply more labor (Rosenzweig 1988) , but find that the increase in home-income is mostly due to the primary worker earning more when he returns home from the city during weeks in which many of his village co-residents are away. Third, the increased agricultural wage rate increases the wage bill for employers and reduces their profit. Fourth, there are no systematic changes in food prices in the village, which suggests that food markets are spatially well integrated.
Our results carry several important implications for development theory and policy. First, the increase in the agricultural wage rate that we document implies that rural labor supply is not as elastic as labor surplus models (e.g. Lewis 1954) presumed. Second, the marginal product of labor in agrarian societies is highly seasonal. Models of rural labor markets should be augmented to account for seasonality, to provide better descriptions of the links between migration and rural development.
Third, our results should encourage policymakers to re-think the various restrictions to internal mobility they have instituted under the guise of rural development policy (Oberai 1983) . Antimigration bias remains rampant in policy circles, and many governments, including China, Indonesia, South Africa, have historically reacted to migration as if "it were an invasion to repel" (Simmons 1981) . The large direct benefits for the migrant's family and indirect benefits for nonmigrants competing in those same labor markets that we document suggest that this mode of thinking, and the associated restrictions imposed on migrants' transport, settlement and employment by policymakers, may be misguided. Concerns about emigration increasing rural poverty and inequality appear to be unfounded, at least in our context. This paper also contributes more broadly to the burgeoning economics literature on program evaluation by developing an experimental and analytical framework that goes beyond estimation of direct effects on the treated population. Comprehensive evaluation requires consideration of general-equilibrium changes, especially if we are interested in assessing possible effects of programs when they are scaled up (Heckman, 1992; Rodrik, 2008; Acemoglu, 2010) . but our results suggest that these considerations might be important.
We describe the problem of seasonality and earlier research on seasonal migration in the next section. We develop a framework to organize our analysis of migration decisions and general 6 equilibrium effects in Section 3. We describe the experiment and the data in Section 4, and present empirical results in Section 5.
Context
Background on Seasonality and Seasonal Migration
Globally, approximately 805 million people are food insecure (FAO 2016) , of which about 600 million are rural residents. Estimated conservatively, half of these people-300 million of the world's rural poor-suffer from seasonal hunger (Devereux et al, 2009 ). In predominantly agrarian economies, seasonal deprivation often occurs between planting and harvest, while farmers have to wait for the crop to grow. Labor demand and wages are low during this period, and the prices of staples like rice tend to increase.
These two facts combine to produce a dire situation in the Rangpur region of Northern Bangladesh, where rice consumption drops dramatically during the lean season. 6 This is an annually repeating phenomenon known as "monga" in Bangladesh, and by other names in other agrarian societies around the world ("hungry season" in southern Africa (Beegle et al 2016) , and "musim paceklik" in eastern Indonesia (Basu and Wong 2012)). The landless poor supplying agricultural labor on others' farms are especially affected when demand for agricultural labor falls. They constitute around 56% of the population in our sample area, and will be the target of the seasonal migration encouragement intervention that we design. Our sampling frame is representative of this 7 landless population in the Rangpur region of Northern Bangladesh. According to the Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics, there are roughly 15.8 million such inhabitants in Rangpur (BBS, 2011) .
According to anthropological accounts, nearby urban and peri-urban areas do not face the same seasonal downturns, and these locations offer low-skilled employment opportunities during that same period (Zug, 2006) . This contrast suggests a seasonal labor misallocation, or a spatial mismatch between the location of jobs and the location of people during that particular season.
Inspired by these observations, Bryan et al (2014) conduct a randomized controlled trial to encourage landless households from the Rangpur region facing seasonal deprivation to migrate during the Monga period to nearby cities to find work. They document positive effects of migration on consumption, and then explore why these households were not already migrating. A conditional transfer of about $8.50-$11 (equivalent to the round-trip travel cost by bus) increases the seasonal migration rate in 2008 by 22%, increases consumption amongst the migrant's family members by 757 calories per person per day in 2008 on average, and also induces 9.2% of the treated households to re-migrate the following year.
Bryan et al (2014) show that the fact that these households were not already migrating in spite of these large consumption gains can be explained by a model in which people living very close to the margin of subsistence are unwilling to take on the risk of paying the cost of migration and sending a member away. Even a small chance that the costly migration fails to generate income could be catastrophic if the household faces a risk of falling below subsistence. Thus, uninsured risk creates a poverty trap in which the extreme poor fail to take advantage of migration opportunities that turn out to be profitable on average. A conditional transfer can address that constraint and create efficiency gains. 8
Potential Spillover Effects of Seasonal Migration
Bryan et al (2014) only focused on households that received migration subsidies, not the spillover effects on non-beneficiaries, or any general equilibrium changes associated with increased scale of emigration. Consideration of general equilibrium effects requires a fundamentally different, and more complicated, data collection and experimental strategy that we employ in this study.
To study market-level effects, the scale of our experiment is five times as large, and we further randomize the proportion of the village population induced to migrate. This design, coupled with data on both households that receive these offers and households that do not, and data from employers and grocers, allow us to report results on general equilibrium effects in labor and food markets. This has become a policy-relevant question, because implementers and funding agencies are advocating for and deploying seasonal migration subsidies in large scale as a social policy to counter seasonal poverty (Evidence Action 2016). Such scale up should be evaluated in terms of both direct and indirect effects.
Experiment and Data
The next two sub-sections set out the details of the experiment and the data collection. 
Intervention
The basic form of our intervention was the offer of a cash grant worth Taka 1,000 ($13.00 USD) to rural households in northern Bangladesh to cover the round-trip cost of travel to nearby cities where there are job opportunities during the lean season. This is a conditional transfer, where 9 the subsidy is conditional on one person from the household agreeing to out-migrate during the lean season. As offers were made, we let households know that they may have a better chance of finding work outside of their village, but we did not offer to make any connections to employers. No requirement is imposed on who within the household has to migrate, or what city they have to go to.
As in Bryan et al (2014) , migration was carefully and strictly monitored by project staff to ensure adherence to the conditionality.
Sampling
The experiment was conducted in 133 randomly selected villages in Kurigram and Lalmonirhat districts of Rangpur. We first conducted village censuses to identify all households that would be "eligible" to receive this intervention in each of these villages. A household was deemed eligible if (1) it owns less than 0.5 acres of land, and (2) it reported back in 2008 that a member had experienced hunger (i.e., skipped meals) during the 2007 monga season. We focused on landownership because land is the most important component of wealth in rural Bangladesh, and it is easily measurable and verifiable. We used the second question on skipping meals to avoid professional, non-agricultural households (who may not own much land, but who are comparatively well off). Our census data suggests that about 57% of households in these villages were eligible to receive the intervention after applying these two criteria.
Random Assignment
We randomly assigned the 133 villages into three groups:
(a) Low Intensity -48 villages where we targeted migration subsidies to roughly 14% of the eligible population.
(b) High Intensity -47 villages where we targeted roughly 70% of the eligible population with migration subsidy offers.
(c) Control -38 randomly selected villages where nobody is offered a migration subsidy.
The high vs low intensity design was chosen to generate significant variation in the size of the emigration shock, but the precise target (14% vs 70%) varied a little across villages within treatment arms. This is because our village population estimates were dated (from 2008) for most (100) villages, and imprecise in the 33 other villages, which made it difficult for us to precisely estimate the ratio (offers/eligible population) in each village.
The sample of 133 villages included the 100 villages that were part of the earlier Bryan et al (2014) experiment, but the majority of the households in our sample are new, and were not included in the earlier experiment. We show in Appendix Tables A2-A4 that participation in the earlier rounds of the experiment has no significant effect on migration decisions this year, and therefore does not materially affect the main results of this paper on the downstream effects of migration on income earned. Controlling for village level random assignment in the earlier rounds does not affect our results either.
Landless households are engaged in both agricultural and non-agricultural work. We had provided experimental instructions to target non-agricultural households first in some (randomly chosen) villages, and our randomization of low vs high intensity was stratified and perfectly balanced by this instruction. During implementation we learned that in reality most households supply labor to some form of agriculture. We show in Tables A2-A4 that the stratification had no effect on migration decisions, nor does it affect our estimates of the effect of treatment intensity on migration or income outcomes.
There were a total of 883 subsidy offers made in the 48 low-intensity villages, 4,881 subsidy offers made in the 47 high intensity villages. The total number of households resident in these 133 villages was 36,808.
Timing
We disbursed grants during the latter part of the monga season, in early November, 2014.
Figure 2 provides a timeline of project activities. Ideally, seasonal migration subsidy offers should be made in September after the rice planting work is done, but our disbursement was delayed due to political disturbance in Bangladesh at that time. Despite this delay, we observe high overall take-up and migration during both the late Monga, and as well as some post-harvest migration after January.
We will also report results on re-migration a year later, covering the full 2015-16 migration season.
Implementing Organizations
All of the implementation activities -the offers and marketing, grant disbursement, and monitoring to ensure adherence to the conditionality, were conducted by RDRS, a local NGO with a long history of engagement in Rangpur, and substantial presence in the region. RDRS runs a microfinance program among other poverty alleviation activities, and this expertise was useful to handle the disbursement of grants, and ensure recovery of funds in cases of non-compliance with the condition associated this grant.
Innovations for Poverty Action in Bangladesh (IPA-B) coordinated all research activities and was responsible for testing and fielding surveys, collecting, cleaning and maintaining data. They also monitored RDRS' implementation activities to ensure that they were conducted in accordance with the research protocol.
Protocol and Logistics
After the research team conducted the sampling and randomization, they provided RDRS staff a list of eligible households in the village and their treatment assignment, and RDRS staff are deployed to the village to implement the intervention. Staff members approach a specific household on their list and first verify that they satisfy the eligibility criteria. Then the household is offered the grant to migrate, and the conditionality is made explicit. The head of the household is told that it if it accepts the grant, one member must use it toward migration travel expenses, and that this will be monitored. Households were also informed that nearby areas may offer better chances of employment than their home village.
Once the conditions of the offer are explained clearly, the household is provided guidance on how to collect the grant funds from their local RDRS office. The staff member collects identification information from the household. If the beneficiary visited the RDRS office to collect the grant, an officer checked their ID before disbursing funds. The grant amount (1000 Taka) was large enough to cover the cost of a round trip bus ticket to nearby popular urban destinations, with some money left over for a few days of board and lodging. 7 RDRS carefully monitored adherence to the conditionality. After funds disbursement, an RDRS officer visited the household to check whether someone had migrated or not. If no one had migrated at the time, the officer reminded the head of household that the grant he received was conditional on migration and if he would not migrate he would be required to return the funds. The officer made two more visits to the households that had failed to migrate, and requested that funds be returned in migration still had not taken place.
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Data Collection
We conducted four separate types of surveys in 2014-15 to capture effects on the labor market choices, other household impacts, effects on employers, and effects on food prices. We conducted two additional surveys a year later (after the lean season in the following year) to capture longer-term persistent effects on households and employers in 2015-16. Figure 1 
High Frequency Labor Market Survey of Households
Soon after the travel grants were disbursed in November 2014, we started surveying 2294 households in both treatment and control villages about their wage and employment conditions. The survey was administered once every 10 days for six rounds starting on December 22, 2014. We therefore refer to this as the "High Frequency Origin Survey". The survey instrument asked respondents about labor market outcomes (income, time spent working, location, industry) and a brief set of questions on consumption (essential food and non-food items) and migrant remittances.
We focus on income and labor market outcomes given our interest in general equilibrium effects, in contrast to Bryan et al (2014) , who largely focused on consumption to evaluate the direct effects of inducing migration. Income is generally thought to be more difficult to measure well in rural, agrarian areas of low income countries due to seasonal variation, multiplicity in sources of income, weekly variation in activities over the course of the agricultural cycle, self-employment and family employment (Deaton and Muellbauer 1982) . This is why we engage in a very expensive method of surveying, visiting households six times on an almost weekly basis and asking about income-generation activities of all household members over only the previous week to minimize recall bias. We also conduct the surveys during a narrow two-month window during which seasonal and employment variation is minimized. The surveys focus on landless households that have minimal self-employment or unpaid family employment on their own farm. This provides us with labor supply choices of all working individuals within each household, the location where they worked (inside the village or at migration destinations), and how much they earn on a daily basis.
This method of surveying produces some ancillary benefits. First, it allows us to track highfrequency movements back and forth between the village and the city. Many migrants travel for only 3-4 weeks at a time and engage in multiple trips during the season. We observe 1.6 trips per migrant on average in our data. Second, the technique also allows us to track intra-household substitutions in labor supply, because we collect data at the individual level. Third, it allows us to cross-validate the direct (income) effects of migration that we estimate, with the consumption outcomes Bryan et al (2014) collected using a completely different surveying method six years prior, but administered on a similar population chosen using the same sampling frame. The magnitudes of income and consumption effects need to be coherent. Fourth, we can also validate our income estimates from the high-frequency survey using income measures collected at the endline household survey we ourselves conduct a few months later. The endline survey, conducted on an overlapping sample of households, asked about migration experience and income during the same season, described in further detail below.
The high-frequency surveys were administered to 709 households that did not receive migration offers in treatment villages, in addition to 865 households that did. Our goal was to track whether offers to a certain sub-group of households lead others to migrate, and track any spillover income and employment effects on those households either at home or at the destination.
Food Price Data: High Frequency Survey of Shopkeepers
We pair the brief consumption module in the high-frequency survey described above with a survey of shopkeepers (i.e. grocery store owners) that was administered simultaneously, in order to collect prices for the same food items that the consumption module asked households about. We collected data on the prices of major food items, including rice, wheat, pulses, edible oil, meat, fish, eggs, milk, salt and sugar. These data allow us to explore whether encouraging migration at large scale in a village (and the extra income that generates) leads to a general equilibrium effects on food markets. It also allows us to convert the food consumption effects to monetary values.
Endline Survey
Next, we conducted a detailed endline survey of 3,602 households during April 2015, before the next rice planting season starts. Figure 1 displays the sample breakdown across treatment arms and across types of households (those offered grants and those who were not). This endline survey collected a broader set of information on migration and other socio-economic outcomes that were not sensible or possible to ask repeatedly on a weekly basis, as in the high frequency survey. Core modules focused on collecting detailed information on the migration experience, including number of members who migrated, timing of migration events and destinations. The survey also delved into income generated by households (especially from migration), behavior and attitude changes, risk coping, credit and savings.
Employer Survey
To measure impacts on the demand-side of the labor market we conducted a survey of 1,099 employers across all villages on the wages they paid for employees around (and after) the time that we disbursed migration grants. We also asked employers to provide qualitative assessments of the 16 ease of finding and hiring workers during that period. We collected data on wages for multiple activities in both agricultural and non-agricultural sectors, separately for males and females hired (since almost all seasonal migrants are male). Unlike the high-frequency wage survey, the employer survey was retrospective, and asked employers to recall wage and employment conditions for every two-week period starting mid-October through the end of December 2014. We are confident of high quality recall because (a) our survey referred to wages paid for specific agricultural activities (e.g.
for planting or for harvest), (b) employers tend to maintain records for their businesses, and (c) survey staff were trained to prompt employers with cues on types and timing of events (e.g.
associating the timing of a given employment activity with a significant cultural or religious event).
Follow-up Survey 2016: Households
To study the longer-term behavior of households, we conducted a follow-up survey in 2016 enquiring about a number of items over the time period beginning mid-August 2015 through mid-August 2016. This survey included questions on migration -specifically, timing and number of episodes, income from migration and questions about resource-sharing by migrants -and the household's experience of hunger over the previous year. This was administered to the original endline sample from the 2014-2015 round of study and we were able to effectively re-interview 3,386 households (from the original 3,602).
Follow-up Survey 2016: Employers
The second component of our follow-up survey work targeted the demand-side of the labor market i.e. employers. We administered a labor demand and wage survey to agricultural employers to better understand the impacts of emigration on their enterprise and decisions. The employer labor demand and wage survey was administered to 649 employers across all 133 villages.
Theory
Offer Intensity and Migration
Our theory characterizes the response of rural labor markets to labor supply shocks (migration). We define a village as the local labor market in which two types of households interact: a. Landless households that supply labor b. Landed farmers that hire labor Our intervention targeted landless households. In any given village, a proportion, , of landless households was provided a travel grant, . The proportion that received the grant was experimentally varied. A member of a landless household that receives the grant, , decides to migrate if the value of migration is greater than wage income from the local labor market,
is wage at migration destination, is the migration subsidy conditional on migration, is the individual specific cost of migration, is the cost of migration that can be shared with other migrants (hence a function of ) and is the village wage. can be interpreted as sharing risk as well, and both and can be influenced by .
And for the remaining 1 households (those who did not receive the grant) decide to migrate if, (4.1.2)
In the above, we assume that the individual cost of migration is distributed,
The above set up suggests that for households that receive the grant ( ), the probability of migration can be expressed as,
And, similarly for the remaining (1 ) unincentivized households the probability of migration is,
This yields an aggregate migration rate in a village, ,
First derivative of the above expression yields the change in migration rate as a function of our field experiment:
G G
(by permitting sharing) by more than the benefits of staying back at home to take advantage of the fact that wages will not fall by as much when many other people in the village emigrate. The relative size of these two factors is testable in our setting: We can compare how each individual receiving a migration subsidy (B) in the low-versus high-intensity village respond to the offer. The response to the exact same offer of B will be stronger in the high intensity village if is larger in magnitude than .
Income and Wage in Origin Labor Market
Suppose each landless household who has not migrated out has a Cobb-Douglas utility function,
Where denotes consumption goods measured in taka and are hours of leisure. is given by, Where is labor hours supplied within the village, is wage in the village, is outside income including income from migration. The time constraint function is given by,
1
The household maximizes expected utility subject to the budget and time constraint,
The FOC condition is, Errors are clustered at the village level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The results in this table were generated using household level data from the endline survey.
The dependent variable in specification (1) is an indicator for whether the household had at least one migrant over the period September 15 2014 -April 30 2015.
The dependent variable in specification (2) is the total number of unique migrants sent by the household over this period. The dependent variable in specification (3) is the total number of migration episodes (i.e. the total number of trips taken by all migrant members of a household) over this period. The dependent variable in specificaiton (4) is re-migration a year later (September 1 2015 -May 31 2016). No further incentives were provided that year, but we collected data to study longer term responses.
All specifications include Upazila fixed effects (an Upazila is an administrative unit that encompasses groups of villages in the sample; there are a total of 14 Upazilas across our sample of villages). Errors are clustered at the village level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The results in this table were generated using a combination of network data from 2013 and migration and treatment data from the 2014 endline survey. Estimations are at the household level.
The network data was generated by asking subject households to answer questions about each of 20 randomly selected households from the same village, including: whether the respondent household knows them at all; whether it knows them well; and whether they can rely upon those other households. The dependent variable in all specifications is the probability that a household had any member who migrated in 2014. The results shown are average marginal effects on a probit regression. Thus the coefficients represent the change in the probability that a household will migrate based on the treatment arm and connection to other households.
Specification (1) shows results for when households are "connected" to at least one other household in the village where "connected" simply means knowing another household. In specification (2) "connected" means knowing another household well enough to rely on them and "partially connected" means knowing another household, but not well, and "not connected" means not knowing the other household at all.
"The independent variables intersect the network data with the treatment data, thus placing households in groups according to two criteria: whether they themselves were offered a subsidy to migrate, and whether they know households that were offered a subsidy. Thus, for instance, "Offered Grant in Low Intensity Treatment Village and Connected to Someone Offered" refers to a household in a low intensity village that was made a migration grant offer and knows another household with someone who was also offered a grant.
All specifications include Upazila fixed effects. (1) is the number of companions with whom a migrant shared their accomodation during this period. The dependent variable in specification (2) is the number of companions with whom a migrant traveled during this period.
All specifications include Upazila fixed effects. The dependent variable in specification (1) is the proportion of landless households eligible for a subsidy in each village that migrated at any point over the period September 15, 2014 -April 30, 2015. The number of eligible households in a village (the denominator) computed based on census data collected in 2008. The formula we used to compute the fractions accounts for the fact that differing fractions of offered and non-offered households were sampled, and we know the sampling probabilities. Specification (2) changes the denominator to "number of total households in the village" also reported in the census data. Note that we do not know the migration rate among landed/ineligible households, so the dependent variable is smaller than the total fraction of the village population that out-migrates.
Specifications (3) and (4) (1) is gross income from migration that migrants generated during the period September 15 2014 -April 30 2015. There are a few massive outliers in reported income, and all columns therefore trim out the extreme 1% of values for the dependent variable (top and bottom). The dependent variable in specification (2) is savings reported by the household, accruing over the same period. All specifications include Upazila fixed effects. Errors are clustered at the village level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The results in this table were generated using household level data from the high frequency survey which interviewed households 6 times between 22nd December 2014 to 28th February 2015.
The dependent variable in specification (1) is total income (in takas) generated by the household i.e. income generated from participation in the origin and the away (i.e. migrant) labor markets for the period covered by the high frequency survey. The dependent variables in specifications (2) and (3) are income (in takas) generated by the household from participation only in the origin labor market and income (in takas) generated by the household from participation only in the away (i.e. migrant) labor market respectively for the period covered by the high frequency survey. The dependent variable in specification (4) is similar to specification (2) but normalized by number of household members i.e. income (in takas) generated by the household from participation only in the origin labor market divided by total number of household members for the period covered by the high frequency survey. The dependent variable in specification (5) is the total number of days that working members of the household participated in the origin and the away (i.e. migrant) labor markets for the period covered by the high frequency survey. The dependent variables in specifications (6) and (7) are number of days that working members of the household participated only in the origin labor market and only in the away (i.e. migrant) labor market respectively, for the period covered by the high frequency survey. The dependent variable in specification (8) is the average daily wage rate across home and away labor markets, computed based on the reported income and days worked by the surveyed household for the period covered by the high frequency survey. The dependent variable in specification (9) is the average daily wage rate in the home labor market, computed based on the reported income and days worked by the surveyed household for the period covered by the high frequency survey. The dependent variable in specification (10) is the average daily wage rate in the away labor market, computed based on the reported income and days worked by the surveyed household for the period covered by the high frequency survey. The dependent variable in specification (11) is the total expenditure on food consumed by the household normalized by number of household members i.e. food consumption by the household divided by total number of household members for the period covered by the high frequency survey.
Daily Income can be computed only for households that have positive number of days worked at that location.
All specifications include Upazila fixed effects. The dependent variable in specification (1) is total income (in takas) generated by the household i.e. income generated from participation in the origin and the away (i.e. migrant) labor markets for the period covered by the high frequency survey. The dependent variables in specifications (2) and (3) are income (in takas) generated by the household from participation only in the origin labor market and income (in takas) generated by the household from participation only in the away (i.e. migrant) labor market respectively for the period covered by the high frequency survey. The dependent variable in specification (4) is similar to specification (2) but normalized by number of household members i.e. income (in takas) generated by the household from participation only in the origin labor market divided by total number of household members for the period covered by the high frequency survey. The dependent variable in specification (5) is the total number of days that working members of the household participated in the origin and the away (i.e. migrant) labor markets for the period covered by the high frequency survey. The dependent variables in specifications (6) and (7) are number of days that working members of the household participated only in the origin labor market and only in the away (i.e. migrant) labor market respectively, for the period covered by the high frequency survey. The dependent variable in specification (8) is the average daily wage rate across home and away labor markets, computed based on the reported income and days worked by the surveyed household for the period covered by the high frequency survey. The dependent variable in specification (9) is the average daily wage rate in the home labor market, computed based on the reported income and days worked by the surveyed household for the period covered by the high frequency survey. The dependent variable in specification (10) is the total expenditure on food consumed by the household normalized by number of household members i.e. food consumption by the household divided by total number of household members for the period covered by the high frequency survey.
All specifications include Upazila fixed effects.
(1)
(2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
LATE (IV) Estimates to Study the Differential Effects of Migration from Low-Intensity and High-Intensity Villages
Errors are clustered at the village level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The results in this table show IV specifications using household level data from the endline survey.
The dependent variable in specifications (1) and (2) are gross migration income; in specifications (3) and (4) are savings; in specifications (5) and (6) are all income (i.e. income from migration, income from home-labor market participation and own-enterprise profits); and, are all labor market income (i.e. income from migration and income from home-labor market participation) reported by the household, accruing over the period September 15 2014 -April 30 2015. Specifications (1), (3), (5) and (7) restrict the analysis to only the control and low-intensity arms; specifications (2), (4), (6) and (8) Errors are clustered at the village level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The results in this table show a set of IV specifications that were generated using household level data from the high frequency survey which interviewed households 6 times between 22nd December 2014 to 28th February 2015. The data across six rounds of surveys are pooled. Labor income is measured as total income (in takas) generated by all household members participating in the labor market in their the origin village or away from the village for the period covered by the high frequency origin survey (HFOS). Specifications (2) and (3) break down income by location. The HFOS also allows to track the number of working days for all household members. The "average daily income" divides home earnings by number of days worked at home, and approximates a wage rate earned by household members working in the home village. HFOS also added just a few questions on food consumption in a few aggregate categories, and we report effects on the total expenditure on food per capita in the last column.
"Migrated", the RHS variable is binary, and =1 if at least one member of household migrated during the entire period covered by HFOS. This variable is instrumented in a 2SLS regression using assignment to treatment (High and Low Intensity, Offered and Non-offered). All specifications include Upazila fixed effects. 
LATE(IV) Estimates of the Effects of Migration on Frequency of Meal Downsizing in the Village During Lean and Non-Lean Seasons
Errors are clustered at the village level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The results in this table show a set of IV specifications that were generated using village level data from the 2016 follow-up survey. The independent variable throughout is the share of eligible villagers who migrated in 2015-2016, instrumented by treatment assignment to high-or low-intensity villages (two excluded dummy variables).
Food insecurity is measured as follows. For every given month from mid-August 2015 to midAugust 2016, each household was asked how many days in that month any member of that household had to cut down on meal portions or number of meals in a day: rarely (0-5 days) or more than that (6 days to the whole month). In our data, rarely is marked as "0" and more than that as "1". Averaged across each village, this gives a village-level measure of food insecurity per month, where a higher score (from 0 to 1) represents more food insecurity (i.e. more hunger). For these tables, the monthly numbers were averaged across the lean months (mid-August 2015-mid-January 2016) and nonlean months (mid-January 2016 to mid-August 2016), giving a measure of food insecurity in each village across these periods. Columns (1), (3) and (5) represent the lean month averages while (2), (4) and (6) represent the nonlean averages. Columns (1) and (2) use the full sample of villages, columns (3) and (4) use the partial sample, where data on village population is of higher quality, and columns (5) and (6) use the compact sample, which is the subset of villages for which we have the most consistent and precise data.
Panel B restricts the sample to the high intensity and control villages only.
( 
LATE(IV) Estimates of the Effects of Migration on Various Food Security Variables in the Village
Errors are clustered at the village level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
The results in this table show a set of IV specifications that were generated using village level data from the 2016 follow-up survey. The independent variable throughout is the share of eligible villagers who migrated in 2015-2016, instrumented by treatment assignment to high-or low-intensity villages (two excluded dummy variables).
Each column represents the village-level average of answers to the questions shown in the columns, where "0" represents a "no" and "1" represents a "yes".
All these specifications use the partial sample of 117 villages, for which we have higher-quality data on village population (the denominator on the RHS).
( The dependent variable is regressed on the proportion of the eligible population that migrated in each village. This was constructed as a ratio of total migrant households in a village and total eligible households in a village. The number of eligible households was available based on previous census data. The total number of migrants was constructed using the same data and formulas used in Table 1 . The independent variable was intrumented with village level assignment to the high intensity treatment.
All specifications include Upazila fixed effects. The dependent variable in specification (1) is total income (in takas) generated by the non-primary working members i.e. income generated by nonprimary working members from participation in the origin and the away (i.e. migrant) labor markets for the period covered by the high frequency survey. The dependent variables in specifications (2) and (3) are income (in takas) generated by non-primary working members from participation only in the origin labor market and income (in takas) generated by non-primary working members from participation only in the away (i.e. migrant) labor market respectively for the period covered by the high frequency survey. The dependent variable in specification (4) is similar to specification (2) but normalized by number of household members i.e. income (in takas) generated by the household from participation only in the origin labor market divided by total number of household members for the period covered by the high frequency survey. The dependent variable in specification (5) is the total number of days that non-primary working members of the household participated in the origin and the away (i.e. migrant) labor markets for the period covered by the high frequency survey. The dependent variables in specifications (6) and (7) are number of days that non-primary working members of the household participated only in the origin labor market and only in the away (i.e. migrant) labor market respectively, for the period covered by the high frequency survey. The dependent variable in specification (8) is the average daily wage rate across home and away labor markets, computed based on the reported income and days worked by the non-primary working members for the period covered by the high frequency survey. The dependent variable in specification (9) is the average daily wage rate in the home labor market, computed based on the reported income and days worked by the non-primary working members for the period covered by the high frequency survey.
All specifications include Upazila fixed effects. The results in this table were generated using household level data from the high frequency survey which interviewed households 6 times between 22nd December 2014 to 28th February 2015. The table presents the proportion of the primary worker's contribution to the total for 9 key labor market outcomes for all households sampled. (1) is income (in takas) generated by the primary worker divided by total household income, for income generated from participation in both the origin and the away (i.e. migrant) labor markets for the period covered by the high frequency survey. The variables in rows (2) and (3) are income (in takas) generated by the primary worker divided by total household income from participation only in the origin labor market and income (in takas) generated by the primary worker divided by total household income from participation only in the away (i.e. migrant) labor market respectively for the period covered by the high frequency survey. The variable in row (4) is the total number of days worked by the primary worker divided by the total number of days worked by the household, for working members of the household that participated in the origin and the away (i.e. migrant) labor markets for the period covered by the high frequency survey. The variables in specifications (5) and (6) are number of days worked by the primary worker divided by the total number of days worked by the household only in the origin labor market and only in the away (i.e. migrant) labor market respectively, for the period covered by the high frequency survey. The variable in specification (7) is the average daily income earned by primary working members divided by household daily income across home and away labor markets, computed based on the reported income and days worked by the surveyed household for the period covered by the high frequency survey. The variables in rows (8) and (9) are the average daily income earned by primary working members divided by household daily income only in the origin labor market and only in the away (i.e. migrant) labor market respectively, computed based on the reported income and days worked by the surveyed household for the period covered by the high frequency survey. The results in rows (1) and (2) of this table were generated using household level data from the endline survey, while results in row (3) were generated using household level data from the high frequency survey.
The variable in row
Row (1) presents simple arithmetic means of the time that migrant members spend away as a proportion of the total time enquired about (over the period September 15 2014 -April 30 2015) for all households in the endline sample. Row (2) presents simple arithmetic mean number of trips that migrant members take (over the period September 15 2014 -April 30 2015) for all households in the endline sample. Row (3) presents the probability that, for a given household in a given round of the interview with no members away, at least one other household within their village has a member away (i.e. a member who is migrant. Errors are clustered at the village level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The results in this table were generated using household level data from the high frequency survey which interviewed households 6 times between 22nd December 2014 to 28th February 2015. The sample is restricted to the contributions of only primary working members to each of the outcomes and only employment outcomes at origin are studied (dependent variables as described below).
The dependent variable in specification (1) is total income (in takas) generated by the primary working member from participation in the origin labor market for the period covered by the high frequency survey. The dependent variable in specification (2) is the total number of days that the primary working member of the household participated in the origin labor market for the period covered by the high frequency survey. The dependent variable in specification (3) is the average daily wage rate in the home labor markets, computed based on the reported income and days worked by the primary working members for the period covered by the high frequency survey.
Low Intensity Treatment Village
High Intensity Treatment Village Errors are clustered at the village level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The results in this table were generated using household level data from the high frequency survey which interviewed households 6 times between 22nd December 2014 to 28th February 2015. The sample is restricted to the contributions of only primary working members to each of the outcomes in the week for which they reported highest income (across all survey periods) and only employment outcomes at origin are studied (dependent variables as described below).
The dependent variable in specification (1) is total income (in takas) generated by the primary working member from participation in the origin labor market during the week in which they earned the highest income (across all survey rounds). The dependent variable in specification (2) is the total number of days that the primary working member of the household participated in the origin labor market during the week in which they earned the highest income (across all survey rounds). The dependent variable in specification (3) is the average daily wage rate in the home labor markets, computed based on the reported income and days worked by the primary working members during the week in which they earned the highest income (across all survey rounds).
All specifications include Upazila fixed effects. Errors are clustered at the village level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The IV results in these tables were generated with the 2016 Follow-up Employer Survey, combined with 2015 migration rates per village derived from the 2016 Follow-up Household Survey. Analysis is conducted at the village level. Uses data from the full sample of villages, and results from the partial sample (with higher quality data on population) look very similar. All money-related variables are measured in taka.
Dependent variables are all measures of profit (net revenues) per decimal (land unit) paid by the employer. Column (1) measures this for 2015; column (2) for 2014; column (3) for 2013; column (4) measures the change in profits per decimal from 2013 to 2014; column (5) measures the change in profits per decimal from 2013 to 2015.
The dependent variable is regressed on a binary variable "Migrated" that takes on the value 1 if at least one member of household migrated during the relevant period and zero otherwise. This variable was instrumented in a 2SLS regression using assignment to low-intensity or high-intensity treatment (as indicated). All specifications include Upazila fixed effects. All specifications include Upazila fixed effects. Errors are clustered at the village level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The IV results in these tables were generated with the 2016 Follow-up Employer Survey, combined with 2015 migration rates per village derived from the 2016 Follow-up Household Survey. Analysis is conducted at the village level. Uses data from the full sample of villages, and results from the partial sample (with higher quality data on population) look very similar. All money-related variables are measured in taka.
Dependent variables are all measures of revenues per decimal (land unit) paid by the employer. Specification (1) has revenue per decimal for 2015; specification (2) has this for 2014 and column (3) has the change in revenues per decimal from 2013 to 2015.
The dependent variable is regressed on a binary variable "Migrated" that takes on the value 1 if at least one member of household migrated during the relevant period and zero otherwise. This variable was instrumented in a 2SLS regression using assignment to low-intensity or high-intensity treatment (as indicated). All specifications include Upazila fixed effects. Errors are clustered at the village level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The IV results in these tables were generated with the 2016 Follow-up Employer Survey, combined with 2015 migration rates per village derived from the 2016 Follow-up Household Survey. Analysis is conducted at the village level. Uses data from the full sample of villages, and results from the partial sample (with higher quality data on population) look very similar. All money-related variables are measured in taka.
Dependent variables in the first three specifications are all measures of costs per decimal (land unit) paid by the employer. Column (1) has cost per decimal for 2015; specification (2) has this for 2014 and specificaiton (3) has the change in costs per decimal from 2013 to 2015. The dependent variable in specificaiton (4) is wage per decimal (land unit) paid by the employer in 2015 (including labor costs of land preparation, sowing, maintenance and harvesting). The dependent variable in specification (5) encompasses costs per decimal incurred by the employer non-wage costs.
The dependent variable is regressed on a binary variable "Migrated" that takes on the value 1 if at least one member of household migrated during the relevant period and zero otherwise. This variable was instrumented in a 2SLS regression using assignment to low-intensity or high-intensity treatment (as indicated). All specifications include Upazila fixed effects. 
